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According to rich and growing empirical literature, one of the main 
deficiencies of Hungarian SMEs is their low growth potential. Survey results 
underline the strong influence of cultural factors including behavioral features 
rooted in the socialist era among the main explanatory factors of entrepreneurs' 
reluctance to expand activity and drive the company ahead, along the usual 
growth path. As opposed to this gloomy general picture, my field investigations 
have supported the hypothesis that knowledge-based entrepreneurs and 




 Introduction  
 
  According to rich and growing empirical literature, one of the main 
deficiencies of Hungarian SMEs is their low growth potential. They are not 
growth oriented, unable and unwilling to move beyond stage one in their life 
cycle.
1 They adopt a traditional attitude of non-reinvesting but taking the profit 
out of their small, family managed ventures. (Czako et al. [1995]; Laky [1998]; 
Laki[1998]; Major [2003]) 
Survey results underline the strong influence of cultural factors (Kuczi 
[2000]; Szerb-Ulbert [2002]) including behavioral features rooted in the socialist 
era
2 among the main explanatory factors of entrepreneurs' reluctance to expand 
activity and drive the company ahead, along the usual growth path. 
                                           
∗ Andrea Szalavetz is researcher at the Institute of World Economics, Hungarian Academy of 
Science in Budapest. 
1 Following Adizes [2004] I refer to stage one of the corporate life cycle as infancy. In this stage 
the idea has already been translated into a product. The main challenge ahead is growth and market 
expansion. The organization is still entrepreneurial: the firm is directed by the owner and founder. 
Transition to professional management is still ahead. Self-financing is the main form of financing. 
2 Socialist entrepreneurs were in a sense similar to the Schumpeterian entrepreneurial ideals. A 
thick layer of citizens (according to estimates, in the early 1980s approximately two thirds of 
Hungarian families) earned at least some of their income in the second economy (Galasi-Szirâczky 
[1985]). These entrepreneurs have thus become capable to understand something about the 
functioning of the market, about autonomous decision-making and about risk-taking. They have 
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Alongside to their lack of dynamism in terms of sales, employment and 
productivity growth, Hungarian SMEs also feature various other deficiencies. 
They operate below minimum efficient size
1; they are unable and unwilling to 
invest into and accumulate intangible assets and they are not innovative. 
As opposed to this gloomy general picture, my field investigations have supported 
the hypothesis that knowledge-based entrepreneurs and companies (KBEs; KBCs) 
are different from average Hungarian entrepreneurs and SMEs in many respects. 
Dissimilarity is first of all related to above-the-average knowledge 
intensity, i.e. to the fact that KBCs' most important asset is knowledge. This 
becomes manifest in above-the-average educational attainment of founders and in 
the above-the-average values of various R&D input and output indicators of the 
firms (R&D ratio; number of researchers employed, patents etc.). This is all the 
more conspicuous in the Hungarian setting, where domestic companies' 
innovative performance is meager. Few of them engage in any kind of R&D 
                                                                                                                     
become capable to learn, adjust and innovate. Their mentality however differed from that of the 
Schumpeterian capitalist entrepreneurs. Second economy participants had a stable job in the state 
sector and they utilized the resources and the assets (raw material and production equipment) of 
their SOEs, which exempted them from the dominant part of the risk capitalist entrepreneurs take. 
Furthermore, their activity satisfied a huge existing demand the centrally planned sector could not 
meet. They thus faced little demand constraint, and little competition. The constraints they faced 
were of a different character: state regulations aimed mainly at restricting expansion. By relaxing 
some restrictions on private enterprises following 1982 the government aimed at increasing 
consumption and at reducing the gap between demand and supply. Private enterprises were thus 
considered as complementary and not contradictory to the socialist system provided their 
expansion remains below a predetermined threshold. It was thus acceptable to increase private 
consumption using the income raised from private entrepreneurship - market supply being the only 
limitation of this endeavor. On the other hand, corporate growth was restricted by several 
regulations, since it was considered contradictory to socialist principles. The mentality of 
increasing entrepreneurs' consumption rather than reinvesting profit has become deeply rooted and 
survived even after the change of the regime. All this is very much different form Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs whose key feature is a relentless strive for growth. 
1 Although in advanced economies firms are frequently larger than their hypothetical efficient size 
(size being determined among others by the features of the production technology) SMEs of 
relatively underdeveloped economies often face the opposite problem: market constraints or rather 
their market acquiring deficiencies as well as capital market imperfections make them operate 
below the efficient size (See Artner  [2005] about Hungary, Surdej  [2000] about Poland). 
According to textbook theses the likelihood of survival is minimal if the gap between the existing 
and the minimum efficient size is persistently large, many of the Hungarian micro and small 
enterprises contradict this thesis: they are dragging on, on the edge of bankruptcy and/or market 
exit for long years, unable to grow. This gives rise to considerable policy concern, because the exit 
rate, i.e. enterprise death rate is also high (which has to be added to those, dragging on without 
growth and profit). Enterprise birth and death in industry was 4,262 and 6,647 respectively in 
2003. The corresponding data for services was 47,589 and 50,127 respectively. Consider 
Portugal's respective data for comparison (a country of similar population size): 2,678 versus 
2,327 in industry, 10,853 versus 7,545 in services. (Source: European Business Facts and Figures 
1995-2005. Panorama of the European Union. European Commission, Eurostat, 2006, p. 20)   66 
activities. According to Pitti's [2006] data taken from the Hungarian Tax 
Authority's database in 2004 there were altogether 434 companies undertaking 
R&D activity in Hungary, with altogether 4309 researchers (These data are much 
lower than the ones registered by the Central Statistical Office (669 and 6704 
respectively) - though according to Pitti, more reliable. The average picture is 
however not really different: more than 99 % of Hungarian companies do not 
perform any R&D activity at all. Although the share of foreign companies (within 
R&D performers) is about 15 % (with 103 R&D-active actors out of 669) - they 
are the ones who finance the dominant part of total corporate R&D expenditures.  
Difference between KBCs and average SMEs (ASMEs) is conspicuous 
also in terms of the former group's performance, capabilities and prospects. Most 
of KBCs are high-growth companies they belong to the emerging group of 
gazelles. KBCs usually internationalize quite early in their life-cycle,
1 and they 
are among the pioneer companies with outward foreign direct investment 
(Antaloczy-Elteto [2002]; Inotai [2005]). 
Another apparent element of KBC-ASME difference can be identified in 
terms of KBCs' diversified portfolios of both domestic and international 
collaborations. Unlike ASMEs' networks, restricted mainly to vertical 
relationships (customers and suppliers) KBCs are characterized by a tight network 
of industry-university linkages including both research and educational 
institutions - partly because their founders have in most of the cases a strong 
academic background. They also possess diversified relations with domestic and 
international NGOs, research funds, business and scientific associations. 
Although KBCs belong to the cream of the economy in every country, 
international comparisons have revealed that their degree of success differs a lot 
even among advanced economies (OECD [2006]). The highest aggregate returns 
related to KBCs' emergence and evolution (i.e. their highest impact on economic 
growth) can be observed in the United States while several European economies 
are seriously lagging behind. As for some post-transforming economies, many of 
the in principle high-growth, new-technology-based startups bounce off an 
invisible ceiling or at least lose energy because both in the early stage of their 
existence and in later stages of initial growth and rapid expansion they encounter 
insurmountable financing difficulties. KBCs' sector-specific features which 
increase investors' perceived risks (volatility in earnings, intangible assets, new 
types of products) are coupled with region-specific financing constraints 
(underdeveloped venture capital markets, unsophisticated public policy 
instruments and underfunded support programs). 
                                           
1 Note, that the theory of internationalization considers international entry as an incremental 
process, that begins relatively late in a firm's life cycle. In contrast, in dynamic and technology-
intensive sectors early internationalization is a catalyst for growth.   67 
This paper summarizes some of the first results of field investigations 
carried out at Hungarian KBCs
1 with special emphasis on (i) explanatory factors 
of their performance (section 2); (ii) the impact of diversification and 
internationalization on growth and competitiveness (section 3). Section 4 
concludes and proposes some policy implications. 
 
Explanatory factors of performance 
 
One of the main explanatory factors of the surveyed firms' success stories 
was their founders' personality. KBCs in the biotechnology and space sectors were 
founded by scientists - which is sector-specific characteristic, while KBCs in the 
IT-industry were founded by entrepreneurial professionals. The main motivation 
of firm foundation was the recognition of commercial opportunity. The surveyed 
space research company for example - a spin-off of University of Miskolc was 
founded by university professors and researchers working at the Faculty of 
Materials Science and Engineering. In the 1980s - still within the Intercosmos
2 
scheme - the Hungarian research team developed a universal multizone 
crystallizator (UMC). In 1991 during the first International Conference on 
Solidification and Gravity, held in Hungary NASA researchers learned about this 
equipment and worked out an agreement with the researchers according to which 
NASA would house the UMC and provide funding for Hungarian scientists to 
work with it in the United States. The equipment was delivered to NASA 
laboratory in 1994 and tested for three years. There, scientists proved, it could be 
used for semiconductor growth. As a result of extensive negotiations on further 
collaboration and the upgrading of the equipment, in 1998 NASA published a 
Research Announcement, soliciting proposals for flight experiments and for 
ground-based experimental and theoretical microgravity research in materials 
science. The researchers recognized that formal participation in NASA tenders 
requires the establishment of a private firm. The newly established firm has not 
only won NASA's tender but has also acquired many further large-scale contracts 
since then, from customers including the European Space Agency, as well as 
Hungarian manufacturing firms and research institutions that rely on the 
company's sophisticated equipment for testing the quality of their products or that 
order custom-made equipment for research purposes. 
Another case for the recognized commercial potential is that of an IT 
company, whose founder got acquainted with IBM PCs already in the 1980s 
                                           
1 This paper draws on the results of surveys at ten and direct in-depth interviews at two Hungarian-
owned KBCs (surveys and interviews targeted both science and engineering based technology 
ventures /see Autio [1997]/ including IT, and biotech firms as well as firms in the instruments and 
space industries.) 
2 The Intercosmos program was a program by the Soviet Union to allow military from allied 
Warsaw Pact and other Socialist nations to participate in space exploration.   68 
during a fellowship in the United States. He studied informatics at Wisconsin 
University, and thereafter worked for various IT firms in New York. This was a 
good start to learn about frontier level technology as well as about IT-related 
business and enterprise resource planning systems (ERP) in practice. Furthermore, 
he earned a lot by Hungarian standards which allowed him to accumulate start-up 
finance for an own KBC. Following his return, he founded his IT company in 
1986 - in an organizational form common that time in the socialist era, a so called 
economic work community (GMK), with the aim of developing an up-to-date 
enterprise information system. Development took two years and costs were 
financed both by the founder's savings and by income generated from hardware 
import, distribution and system integration. Market for ERP systems grew rapidly 
from the mid-1990s on, so both sales and employment increased substantially - 
maybe not as rapidly as in the case of the other surveyed IT-firm that was 
included as a "Rising Star" firm in Deloitte's Technology Fast 50
1 (the company 
achieved a 30-fold increase in sales between 2003 and 2006 with sales amounting 
to HUF 603 million /EUR 2.4 million/ in 2006). This latter company developed 
intelligent client management system and information terminals used by banks, 
telecommunication companies, public utility companies and public institutions 
(including healthcare institutions, registry offices, social services institutions). 
As for the founders' personal features, it was interesting to note their 
strong business orientation (entrepreneurial drive) which is still not common in 
transforming economies. In the socialist era, company managers used to be 
engineers and good professionals rather than good managers: their R&D 
orientation was rather that of technological perfectionism than that of commercial 
opportunity. Similarly, researchers, working academic institutions were also basic 
research oriented, caring little for devising applications for new scientific concepts 
and turning these applications into viable products. The surveyed CEOs are highly 
talented people, and they could go abroad quite early in their careers - most of 
them still as university students. In this way they could experience the innovation 
and commercialization practice of advanced economies. 
Following the establishment of their own companies, most of them had to 
change their core activity in which they were so talented: they have quickly turned 
from a talented professional into a business manager. They dedicated more and 
more time to tender application writing, network building, management and 
market acquiring activities instead of pure research. All in all the founders' 
personality: their creativity and their relentless strive for business and 
technological achievements, was always an important explanatory factor of 
success. The interviewed managers were visionary and risk taking, able to identify 
trends and emerging opportunities. A highly important success factor was in most 
                                           
1 Deloitte's Technology Fast 50 is an annual listing of the 50 fastest growing technology 
companies in the world.   69 
cases that they managed to transfer their exceptional commitment to other 
members of the management team. 
Their research mindedness was however sometimes in conflict with 
business mindedness. In some cases business considerations overcame the 
scientific ones, in others it was strive for technological perfectionism that defeated 
business considerations. Example for the first was the case the way some science-
based biotech firms tried to solve the problem stemming from the ad hoc character 
of income. Biotech firms are usually tempted to solve this problem by engaging 
into less innovation-intensive activities (than the firm's core competence), trying 
to find contracts for their testing laboratories, engaging into routine analytical 
activities, clinical trials etc. This increases the predictability of business 
operations but reduces the innovation-intensity involving various related hazards 
(e.g. losing the skills to be at the frontier of the science, engaging into low value 
added activities in order to sustain the firm and/or employment etc.). 
An example for the latter case was when the technological perfectionism 
of the founder of one of the surveyed IT companies and his insisting in offering 
only frontier-level solutions resulted in opportunity costs from business point of 
view. The surveyed company was the first (in Europe!) to switch from command-
line (CLI), to graphical user interface (GUI) in 1994. They abandoned the 
outdated CLI technology, so they neglected the benefits to be drawn from a 
carefully managed endgame strategy (see e.g. Ghemawat-Nalebuff [1998]) which 
promised substantial income and a large customer base
1 for local competitors for 
at least half a decade thereafter! 
 
Factors of growth - diversification and internationalization 
 
KBCs usually target niche markets with their new knowledge-intensive 
products and services. IT firms usually target the domestic market first. In 
contrast, the surveyed biotech and space firms were internationalized at the outset 
mainly because of the sector-specific characteristics of the two scientific 
disciplines (companies in these sectors are "born global"). In the early stage of 
KBCs' life cycles even niche markets offer splendid growth opportunities. High 
growth means return on capital in excess of the costs of capital. This is possible in 
the increasing returns setting of the knowledge economy in general and the high-
growth IT-industry in particular. Consider the textbook example for increasing 
returns: Development of the first copy of a new software solution amounts to a 
                                           
1 Note that implementing an ERP system is to some extent deterministic i.e. the technology has 
substantial lock-in effects. It makes the switching to another system (to another software 
infrastructure) prohibitively expensive since the implementing firms have to carry out 
organizational changes: adjust their organizational structure and their business process so that they 
match with the logic of the system.   70 
couple of millions of dollars. The costs of the second and additional copies are no 
more than one or two dollars a copy, comprising the costs of the CD ROM and of 
packaging. However, domestic market oriented IT firms' markets will, irrespective 
of market size become sooner of later saturated. Furthermore, their niche is 
usually contested by newly emerging technological startups and/or by diversifying 
large multinational companies that enter their segments. 
Diversification, both in terms of new products and in terms of new 
markets i.e. the acquiring of foreign markets or public sector contracts alongside 
to private ones, seems a good way to sustain growth. Public procurement contracts 
could offer huge growth opportunity for IT firms. Winning public contracts 
however, proved more difficult for the surveyed firms than expected, even if 
compared to the solutions of the key multinational actors, KBCs' systems are 
usually highly price competitive and implementation time is also much shorter. 
Nevertheless, the 'costs per economic value' reasoning that applies in the private 
sector has to be complemented with a multitude of other factors to make the 
products persuasive under public sector conditions. As opposed to private sector 
companies' unambiguous profit maximization drive, public sector decision-makers 
are guided by two (often conflicting) motivations: cost minimization and risk 
avoidance. The latter factor makes them opt for MNCs' much more expensive 
solutions. 
The two surveyed IT firms adopted two different strategies to overcome 
this problem: one of them tries to avoid applying for public sector contracts and 
tries to expand its activity internationally instead. The other firm invested in 
customer relationship management and tried to accumulate a substantial stock of 
social capital. Accumulating so called "relational assets" in this industry facilitates 
the acquiring of both new private customers and contracts from the public sector. 
As for private customers, note, that ERP systems process confidential enterprise 
data. Trust is crucial also because the benefit an ERP system can yield to the 
company is not securely predictable. The usefulness of the product can be verified 
only with a substantial delay following its purchase. Consumers have limited 
information on most of relevant product details, and the whole process involves 
considerable risks {Scott-Vessey [2002]), which all make transactions more trust-
based than in the case of pure market-transactions. As far as public contracts are 
concerned, transactions are to an even larger extent trust-based than in the case of 
private customers. 
Meanwhile this firm also makes substantial efforts to expand through 
internationalization, since above and beyond a certain revenue threshold 
internationalization is a prerequisite for business success also in the software 
industry. 
The surveyed space industry firm offers good example for diversification 
in terms of products. During its startup phase, the founder concentrated on the 
specific business opportunity NASA's Research Announcement meant for them.   71 
Previously, researchers at the university performed mainly academic, pre-
competitive research. In contrast, NASA's research announcement was a business 
proposal of a value amounting to approximately hundred thousand dollars. It 
ensured workload during more than a year for the newly established company. 
Over time, based on the original concept, a whole family of UMC furnaces was 
developed. 
However, demand for multizone furnaces and single crystal growth 
techniques suddenly experienced a setback with the shift in Bush administration's 
space related priorities. In January, 2004 "A Renewed Spirit of Discovery" was 
published by president Bush,  in which  he formulated America's  new "Vision for 
Space 
Exploration". The new strategy envisaged the return to the moon as top priority 
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/space/renewed_spirit.html). According to the Vision, 
the main future focus of American space-related research should be astronauts' 
health. The main target of public investment in space-related research should be 
the elaboration of ways to protect the crews from the space environment during 
long-duration voyages. The new program involved a complete restructuring of 
NASA activities. NASA had to stop certain research programs, including most 
microgravity and material science research. 
This had painful consequences for international representatives of research 
and industry that specialized in this field, forcing many of the players to change 
the core activity or at least to diversify it. This was the time when the surveyed 
company laid increasing emphasis on another research direction: metal foam 
research and the development of materials science related technologies. Its 
customer orientation has also changed. Originally, NASA was the main customer. 
From the second half of the 2000s on, ESA became the most important customer. 
Furthermore, the company made increased efforts to gain some commercial 
market share alongside to the institutional one. They tried to increase the sales 
share of services, they provide with the help of their high-tech laboratory 
equipment. This strategy is in line with Christensen's [1997] concept of 
"disruptive innovation": the number of consumers can be increased if a high-tech 
company starts to use its technology also at the lower end of the market. As an 
example, recently they acquired two high-value infrared cameras, bought in the 
frame of an EU project, and provide infrared services related to biological 
applications, thermal conductivity measurement in buildings, diagnostics of 
electric systems and various other applications. Infrared cameras are used to 
prepare the thermal map of estates in partnership with a real estate developer. 
In sum, the company - similarly to all other international actors in the 
space industry - makes huge efforts to increase the importance of ground-related 
(as opposed to space-related) activities. They target universities with the offer of   72 
designing and creating specific research equipment.
1 They make business 
partnership proposals for joint technology development, and target Hungarian 
manufacturing companies. 
Conclusions and policy implications 
The surveyed cases demonstrate the validity of the otherwise consensus 
view, that KBCs are highly important in terms of new member states' necessary 
transition from their present investment-driven to an innovation-driven growth. 
Policy requirements go however beyond the objective of contributing to the 
maximization of the number of knowledge-intensive startups with instruments 
including direct financial and indirect technical assistance (e.g. funding of 
feasibility studies, commercialization assistance, training etc.). KBCs themselves, 
especially university spin-offs have to undergo a transition: from a status of living 
off research grants and subsidies to that of a business oriented company with 
commercialization capability and a dense network of linkages to companies 
interested in using their research results. 
Much institutional development (e.g. in the field of support agencies,
2 
venture capital market etc.) is necessary to support KBCs, once they enter a high-
growth phase (with or without internationalization). Since the most valuable part 
of KBCs' assets is intangible which limits the opportunity of collateral-based 
lending, KBCs' financing constraints are even more pressing than those of 
ASMEs. KBCs should in fact be considered as a special case, featuring special 
qualities, constraints and requirements. As it was powerfully demonstrated by 
Storey and Tether [1998], where policies have been focused exclusively upon 
KBCs (as in Germany, the United Kingdom, or later in Ireland
3) they have proved 
quite successful in closing the huge performance gap in this respect, between the 
U.S. and the European Union. 
                                           
1 One example is the laser-detector developed for the University of Miskolc that surveys the 
properties of foams. 
2 Researchers work in a non-commercial environment. However, in advanced economies 
universities usually have technology transfer offices that support commercialization. In contrast to 
transforming economies, the term "technology transfer" has a different meaning in advanced 
economies. In transforming economies this term denotes the transfer of technology and know-how 
by multinational companies to their local subsidiaries and in a broader sense also the spillover 
effects of multinationals' investments. In contrast, in advanced economies technology transfer 
denotes commercialization, i.e. the turning of scientific concepts into viable products by selling the 
technology of the concept's elaborated commercial application to private companies. 
3 See Szalavetz [2007.a, b] about KBC promotion in Ireland.   73 
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